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ABSTRACT
An increasing number of online knowledge communities have started incorporating the cut-edge FinTech, such as the tokenbased incentive mechanism running on blockchain, into their ecosystems. However, the improper design of incentive
mechanisms may result in reward monopoly, which has been observed to harm the ecosystems of exiting communities. This
study is aimed to ensure that the key factors involved in users’ reward distribution can truly reflect their contributions to the
community so as to increase the equity of wealth distribution. It is one of the first to comprehensively balance a user’s historical
and current contributions in reward distribution, which has not received sufficient attention from extant research. The simulation
analysis demonstrates that the proposed solution of amending the existing incentive mechanism by incorporating a refined
reputation indicator significantly increases the equity of rewards distribution and effectively enlarges the cost of achieving reward
monopoly.
Keywords: Blockchain, knowledge community, wealth inequality, incentive mechanism.
INTRODUCTION
Online knowledge communities have become increasingly popular for knowledge sharing and communication (Chen, Baird &
Straub, 2019; Liu et al., 2020; Rafiei & Kardan, 2015). Famous examples include Quora, Stack Exchange, and Yahoo Answer.
However, the lack of an effective incentive mechanism in these communities has led to the decrease of users' enthusiasm to
contribute knowledge, and free-riding behaviors have emerged intensively (Kim & Chung, 2018). According to recent statistics,
in most knowledge communities, only 1% of users produce original content, 9% of users contribute by synthesizing or curating
content, and 90% of users consume content without contributing (Kwon, 2020).
With the development of financial technologies (FinTech), such as blockchain and the token economy, knowledge communities
have started embracing these cut-edge technologies to develop precise incentive mechanisms in a decentralized and autonomous
manner. Users who post and discover high-quality content and those who contribute to knowledge dissemination can be
economically rewarded (Sun et al., 2019). The token-based incentive mechanisms have shown their effectiveness to some level
in promoting contributions in knowledge communities. Typical examples include Steemit (https://steemit.com/), one of the most
popular blockchain-enabled and autonomous knowledge communities.
Regardless of their popularity, blockchain-enabled communities are facing great challenges due to the improper design of their
incentive mechanisms. In these communities, as a common form, the voting rights of users are weighted by the tokens they have
owned. Such mechanism design is good at increasing the effectiveness of decision-making and promoting user contributions at
the early stage of the community. However, as the community evolves, a large number of rewards, as well as voting rights, tend
to be obtained by a small number of users, who will monopolize the community. As a result, most ordinary users keep
contributing knowledge and voting for good content, but they fail to get the corresponding rewards since the rewards are
distributed according to the weights of voting rights. In other words, monopoly turns the community from decentralized towards
centralized, seriously harming most users’ enthusiasm for the community.
The problem of the current incentive allocation scheme has been identified and highlighted by recent studies, and its seriousness
can be easily observed from real-world communities. For example, some scholars have found that the decentralization of
blockchain-driven platforms, such as Steemit, Swarm City, Bihu, etc., is far below the ideal level, and the incentive system is
abused (Guidi, Michienzi & Ricci, 2020). By analyzing the data collected from Steemit on November 12, 2020, we find that
only 0.035% of users controlled over 64% of the voting rights, and this figure is still growing. During December 2020, these
powerful users took up 74.8% of the total upvoting rewards in the community, but the percentage of posts they upvoted was less
than 1%. Therefore, the distribution of tokens in the community does not effectively reflect the level of knowledge contribution
of users, which is of primary concern to us.
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Obviously, how to resolve the monopoly of incentive allocation is an urgent issue faced by both academia and communities.
However, existing studies in this field mostly focus on detecting and preventing some specific speculative actions for
monopolizing rewards, such as using voting bots (Li & Palanisamy, 2019; Guidi & Michienzi, 2020). They fail to address the
problem in a more holistic manner by considering how to eliminate the association between the voting weights and the tokens
accumulated not from community contributions but from purchasing and renting, which we believe is fundamental and critical.
In addition, our focus is not on how to achieve the absolutely equal distribution of wealth, as we cannot deny that there are large
discrepancies in the level of knowledge contribution of users in the community. Therefore, to fill in the research gap, in this
study, we propose to tackle the problem from the angel of equity theory and incorporate the idea from the reputation system to
quantify users’ contribution when amending the incentive mechanism. Our main objective is to ensure that the key factors
involved in users’ reward distribution can truly reflect their contributions to the community so as to increase the equity of wealth
distribution.
A simulation analysis based on a real-world dataset collected from Steemit has shown that our proposed solution can reduce the
Gini Index of upvoting rewards distribution by 53% and increase the correlation coefficient between users’ historical
contributions and their upvoting rewards by eight times, without losing the consideration on their current contributions to
determining the total rewards of the posts they have upvoted. Moreover, the simulation results also indicate that the proposed
solution has created a huge barrier to achieving a rewarding monopoly.
In summary, the novelty and contributions of our work lie in the following: (1) We are among the first to amend the incentive
mechanism design in blockchain-enabled knowledge communities by comprehensively considering the trade-off between users’
historical and current contributions in reward distribution; (2) We enrich the relevant research of equity theory by expanding its
application scenarios to a specific form of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) which has a distinctive character
of a strong link between users’ property and voting rights; (3) Our validation approach of combining empirical analysis with
incentive mechanism simulation based on a real-world dataset collected from Steemit provides implications for the practice of
blockchain-enabled incentive mechanism design.
RELATED WORK
This section reviews and discusses related work to our study. First, we summarize the literature on the impact of incentive
mechanisms on knowledge contribution that motivates our work. Then, we review the literature on equity theory, which is the
theoretical foundation of our work, and its applications on incentive mechanism design. Finally, we discuss some of the recent
work on the reputation systems that are the main approach we adopt to solve the problem.
Impact of Incentive Mechanism on Knowledge Contribution
For online knowledge communities, motivation is the key to driving users to participate in knowledge sharing. Motivation theory
has been widely used to explain users' online participation behavior (Roberts et al., 2006; Huang et al., 2018). Motivation theory
divides motivation into two types, including intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). To motivate
individuals to share their knowledge in online communities, the method of financial rewards is a typical approach (Zhao, Detlor,
& Connelly, 2016; Kuang et al., 2019). A great deal of previous research has investigated the influence of external motivation
on knowledge contribution. For example, Ryan and Deci (2000) emphasized the importance of external motivation. In their
seminal article, they demonstrated that economic rewards provided not only extrinsic motivation but also enhanced intrinsic
motivation. Chen, Chang, and Liu (2012) had taken a different approach by focusing on the influence conditions of motivation,
incentive mechanism, and satisfaction on knowledge sharing behavior. Their studies had concluded that the incentive mechanism
was a significant predictor of the knowledge acquisition motivation of virtual community members.
Overall, these studies indicate that external incentive has a positive effect on enhancing users' willingness to contribute
knowledge. Therefore, a proper design of incentive mechanisms in the knowledge community plays an important role in the
development of the community. Although these studies have highlighted the importance of economic incentives on knowledge
contributions, they have not considered the impact of incentive equity, which is the focus of our work.
Application of Equity Theory in Incentive Distribution
Although economic incentives have been found to have a positive effect on enhancing users' knowledge contribution, some
studies have also found that if the distribution of wealth is unequal, it will hinder knowledge sharing, which is related to equity
theory. The first systematic study of equity theory was reported by Adams (1963). Equity theory tries to explain people's
perception, evaluation, and behavioral judgment of equity. There is a large volume of published studies describing the
relationship between the equity of the distribution of economic incentives and the willingness to share knowledge. An empirical
study on investigating the motivations behind people's intentions to continue knowledge sharing in open professional virtual
communities implied that justice factors appear to be important in leading to higher satisfaction levels (Wolfe & Loraas, 2008;
Chiu et al., 2011). Furthermore, Mirkovski et al. (2019) empirically proved that users' sense of equity in obtaining incentives in
the community has a moderating effect on the relationship between users' psychological motivation and their willingness to share
information.
These studies have summarized the importance of ensuring the equity of incentive distribution to the sustainability of online
communities, and they have confirmed the applicability of equity theory in a related context. However, they do not provide any
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specific solution to avoid the inequity of incentive distribution, nor do they keep track of the recent development of the
blockchain-enabled incentive mechanisms, which is the focus of our work.
Incentive Distribution Based on Reputation System
To ensure the equity of the incentive distribution of the community, the biggest challenge we face is how to quantify the level
of user contribution to the knowledge community. We borrow the idea from the reputation system to formulate our solution. The
reputation system is an interactive mechanism, which is the result of a long-term dynamic repeated game of users (Gong & Fan,
2019). A reputation score is an indicator used by the online knowledge community to represent the historical performance of
users (Wei, Chen & Zhu, 2015). In recent years, there has been an increasing amount of literature on the combinations of
reputation systems and incentive mechanisms. For example, Zhao, Yang, and Li (2012) and Thanasis and George (2010) showed
that the establishment of a reputation system based on an incentive mechanism could promote more real feedbacks and, in return,
could form a more reliable and trustful reputation system. Gong and Fan (2019) indicated that compared with the incentive model
without reputation mechanism, the optimal dynamic model combining the reputation mechanism with the explicit incentive
mechanism could not only realize Pareto improvement and increase the incentive intensity, but also improve the level of
information sharing efforts in social networking services.
As discussed above, these existing studies have provided both theoretical and empirical supports to our idea of incorporating
users’ reputations in incentive mechanism design. However, none of them have considered the application of user reputation in
increasing community equity. Therefore, our work is aimed to implement a more comprehensive incentive mechanism design
that considers users’ reputations for addressing the shortcomings caused by an inequity.
MODEL DESCRIPTION
Description of Key Variables
In the following, we will identify and introduce the key variables involved in our model, including Voting Power, Weighted
Power, Vesting Shares, Rshares, ∆t, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ,𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 .
Voting Power (𝑉𝑃 )
Voting Power is a variable designed to restrict the abuse of upvoting rights by users in order to maximize their profits. When a
user's Voting Power is low, his/her votes will carry less influence, resulting in fewer voting rewards. The community recharges
a user's Voting Power by a maximum of 20% every day, with an upper bound of 100%. The recharge of Voting Power starts
right after each vote in the following manner:
𝑉𝑃 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑉𝑃0 +

20%
24×60×60

× 𝑡0 , 100%}

(1)

where 𝑉𝑃0 is the last Voting Power. 𝑡0 is the elapsed seconds from the last vote of the curator.
Weighted Power (𝑊𝑃 )
Weighted Power means a user's level of preference for a post. It can be calculated by Eqs. (2):

𝑊𝑃 = 𝑉𝑃 ×

|𝑊|

(2)

100%

where W is the weight that he/she can set for his/her vote, from 1% to 100%. This weight is positive for upvote and negative for
the downvote.
Vesting Shares (𝑉𝑆 )
Vesting Shares represents the worth of a vote. The value of Vesting Shares is not only related to the number of effective Steem
Power a user holds but also related to the total Vesting Shares and total Steem Power of the community. It can be calculated as:

𝑉𝑆 =

𝑆𝑃
𝑇𝑉𝑓𝑠

× 𝑇𝑉𝑠 =

𝑆𝑃1 −𝑆𝑃2 +𝑆𝑃3
𝑇𝑉𝑓𝑠

× 𝑇𝑉𝑠

(3)

where 𝑆𝑃 is effective Steem Power the user holds, 𝑆𝑃1 is the Steem Power, the user, holds, 𝑆𝑃2 is the Steem Power of outgoing
delegation, 𝑆𝑃3 is the Steem Power of receiving the delegation, 𝑇𝑉𝑠 is the total Vesting Shares of the community, and 𝑇𝑉𝑓𝑠 is the
total Steem Power of the community.
Rshares (𝑅𝑆)
Rshares reflect a user's contribution to the growth of a post's rewards. It can be positive or negative, depending on whether the
user upvotes or downvotes the post. It can be calculated by Eqs. (4):
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+𝑉𝑆 × 106 ×
𝑅𝑆 = {
−𝑉𝑆 × 106 ×

𝑊𝑃 +𝑐
𝑑

100%
𝑊𝑃 +𝑐
𝑑

100%

for upvote
(4)
for downvote

where 𝑐 and 𝑑, which are used to control the decreasing rate of Weighted Power, are set to 0.0049 and 50 respectively in Steemit.
𝜟𝒕
𝛥𝑡 is a variable designed to reflect the early voting penalties. If curators vote for a post within the first 5 minutes after the post
is created, a certain portion of their rewards will be deducted and sent to the author.

𝑡

𝛥𝑡 = {5
1

for 𝑡 < 5𝑚𝑖𝑛

(5)

for 𝑡 ≥ 5𝑚𝑖𝑛

where 𝑡 is the time of upvote after posting, ∆t is the portion of their curation reward that remained for the curator.
𝑷𝑺𝑷
𝑃𝑆𝑃 =

𝑅𝑆𝑇
𝑅𝑐

× 𝑅𝑏

(6)

where 𝑃𝑆𝑃 is the total payout of the post, 𝑅𝑆𝑇 is the total Rshares, 𝑅𝑏 is the reward balance of the community, and 𝑅𝑐 is the
recent claims, i.e., the total Rshares of all posts that have not been settled yet.
𝑷𝒄𝒖𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓
𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 is the reward for a single curator. Up to 50% of the total payout is awarded to curators who upvote the post as a reward
for discovering the content. The remaining 50% is awarded to the authors. Eqs. (7) is the original upvoting reward distribution
scheme.
𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 = 0.5 × 𝑅𝑆𝑇 ×

𝑅𝑏
𝑅𝑐

×

𝑅𝑆′ +𝑅𝑆
𝑅𝑆′
−
√𝑅𝑆′ +𝑅𝑆+2𝑠 √𝑅𝑆′ +2𝑠
𝑅𝑆𝑇
√𝑅𝑆𝑇 +2𝑠

× 𝛥𝑡

(7)

where 𝑅𝑆 ′ is the Rshares accumulated by the post before the curator votes, 𝑠 equals 2 × 1012 in Steemit.
Model Construction
In Steemit, Steem Power is similar to equity in a company, which reflects how much influence a user has in the community.
Holders of Steem Power can not only receive dividends but also influence the value of posts. However, Steem Power is not a
good indicator for users' past contribution since users can acquire a large amount of Steem Power in a short time through leasing
or purchasing. Steem Power soon becomes the key factor of causing upvoting reward monopoly. Based on this, one might reckon
that the simplest solution would be to remove purchased/rented tokens from the incentive system. However, as a cryptocurrency,
the free exchange in the market is one of the basic characteristics of tokens, so it is not reasonable to do that. From another
perspective, this study is aimed to alleviate the inequality of community upvoting rewards distribution indicated by the Gini
Index, and at the same time, to balance users' historical contributions and their current contribution to determining the total
rewards of the post, respectively, when distributing the upvoting rewards.
In order to achieve the above objectives, we need to introduce more variables to indicate the aspects being considered in upvoting
reward distribution. First of all, the reputation system of the community plays an important role in promoting user participation
in knowledge-sharing activities by quantifying users' past contributions to the community, which can fulfill our requirements.
Therefore, the first main amendment of the upvoting rewards is to incorporate a user reputation indicator. However, the total
rewards for the author of a post and all the curators who upvote this post are determined by the Rshares of these curators. In
other words, the Rshares of a curator indicates his/her current contributions to the total rewards of a post. A curator's Rshares
should not be totally ignored when distributing the rewards. Otherwise, it will badly harm fairness and will lower users'
willingness to upvote a post. Therefore, by making a tradeoff, we propose to incorporate both the reputation indicator and the
Rshares of users, reflected as their corresponding proportions, into the upvoting reward calculation. The proportions are
determined in an experimental way that will be introduced later.
The detailed amended upvoting reward calculation is illustrated in Algorithm 1. Specifically, a curator's upvoting reward for a
post will be calculated by two steps: (1) Calculate the total rewards for this post upon Eqs. (1-6); (2) Calculate the specific reward
that can be allocated to the curator. Our upvoting reward amendments are made upon Eqs. (7) which is the original upvoting
reward distribution scheme of Steemit. Firstly, we split the total rewards into two parts. One part is for the users’ historical
contribution indicated by their reputation, and the remaining part is for their current contribution indicated by their Rshares. We
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define a new variable PR∈[0,100%], i.e., the proportion of reputation reward, to control the proportion of rewards assigned to
the reputation aspect, and then 1 − 𝑃𝑅 indicates the proportion of rewards assigned to the Rshares aspect.

Algorithm 1: Optimized upvoting reward distribution algorithm
Input: the total votes of the post N, the serial number of the curator i, the proportion of reputation reward
PR, 𝑉𝑃𝑖 , 𝑊𝑖 , 𝑆𝑃𝑖 , 𝑇𝑉𝑠 , 𝑇𝑉𝑓𝑠 , 𝑅𝑏 , 𝑅𝑐, ∆𝑡_𝑖, H∈{0,1}, the reputation score of the curator 𝑅𝑈𝑖 .
Output: Upvoting reward of the curator 𝑃curator_𝑖 .
1: 𝑅𝑆𝑇 ←0; 𝑅𝑆 ′ ← 0; 𝑅𝑆0 ← 0; 𝑅𝐷𝑇 ←0; 𝑅𝐷 ′ ←0; 𝑅𝐷0 ← 0;
2: for all i∈[1,N] do
3:
𝑊𝑃𝑖 = 𝑉𝑃𝑖 ∗ |𝑊𝑖 |;
4:
𝑉𝑆𝑖 = 𝑆𝑃𝑖 ∗ 𝑇𝑉𝑠 /𝑇𝑉𝑓𝑠 ;
5: if H=0 // upvote
6:
𝑅𝑆𝑖 = + 𝑉𝑆𝑖 ∗ 106 ∗ (𝑊𝑃𝑖 + 0.49%)/50;
7: else // downvote
8:
𝑅𝑆𝑖 = − 𝑉𝑆𝑖 ∗ 106 ∗ (𝑊𝑃𝑖 + 0.49%)/50;
9: if 𝑅𝑈𝑖 <=25
10:
𝑅𝐷𝑖 =0;
11: else
12: 𝑅𝐷𝑖 =𝑅𝑈𝑖 ∗ (𝑅𝑈𝑖 − 25); // the reputation indicator of the curator i
13: for all j∈[1,N] do
14:
𝑅𝑆𝑇 ← 𝑅𝑆𝑇 + 𝑅𝑆𝑗 ;// the total Rshares of the post after a week
15:
𝑅𝐷𝑇 ← 𝑅𝐷𝑇 + 𝑅𝐷𝑖 ; // the total 𝑅𝐷 of curators who upvote the post after a week
16: for all k∈[0,i-1] do
17:
𝑅𝑆 ′ ← 𝑅𝑆 ′ + 𝑅𝑆𝑘 ;// the total Rshares accumulated by the post before the curator i votes
18: 𝑅𝐷 ′ ← 𝑅𝐷 ′ + 𝑅𝐷𝑘 ; // the total 𝑅𝐷 of curators before the curator i votes
19: 𝑃𝑠𝑝 = 𝑅𝑆𝑇 ∗ 𝑅𝑏 /𝑅𝑐 ;
20: 𝑊𝑆 = ((𝑅𝑆 ′ + 𝑅𝑆𝑖 )/𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑆 ′ + 𝑅𝑆𝑖 + 2𝑠) − 𝑅𝑆 ′ /𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑆 ′ + 2𝑠))/(𝑅𝑆𝑇 /𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝑆𝑇 + 2𝑠);
21: 𝑊𝐷 = ((𝑅𝐷 ′ + 𝑅𝐷𝑖 )/𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝐷 ′ + 𝑅𝐷𝑖 + 2𝑠) − 𝑅𝐷 ′ /𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝐷 ′ + 2𝑠))/(𝑅𝐷𝑇 /𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡(𝑅𝐷𝑇 + 2𝑠);
22: 𝑃curator_𝑖 = 0.5 ∗ 𝑃𝑠𝑝 ∗ (𝑊𝑆 ∗ (1 − 𝑃𝑅) + 𝑊𝐷 ∗ 𝑃𝑅) ∗ ∆t_i;
23: return (𝑃curator_𝑖 );
24: end if
25: end for
26: end for
To determine the reputation reward, the main problem that we need to deal with is how to design a suitable reputation indicator
for reward distribution. To quantify a user’s historical contributions, Steemit uses a variable Reputation Number that is directly
correlated with the user’s Rshares received by users for their posts and comments, as is shown in Eqs. (8), to address the widerange problem of the Reputation Number, Steemit applies a logarithm transformation to generate a new indicator RU. But it goes
from one extreme to the other, making the difference of reputation among users very tiny so that it cannot significantly
differentiate the users’ historical contributions. With this regard, this study defines a new variable, reputation indicator 𝑅𝐷 in
Eqs. (9). Through this nonlinear relationship, the historical contribution level of users can be reflected more reasonably. The
effectiveness analysis of this part of improvement will be further discussed later.

𝑅𝑈 = (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 − 𝑎) × 𝑏 + 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝑅𝐷 = 𝑅𝑈 × (𝑅𝑈 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)

(8)
(9)

Where 𝑅𝑈 represents the user's reputation score, a and b, which are used for controlling the growth rate of RU, are both set to 9
in Steemit. Initial Score is the user's initial reputation score. Steemit sets the Initial Score to 25. When 𝑅𝑈 is lower than the initial
reputation score of 25, 𝑅𝐷=0, indicating that the user does not contribute to the community.
The next problem is how to distribute rewards among all the curators who upvote the same post. The proposed allocation method
is similar to Steemit's original calculation method in Eqs. (7), which adopts upvoting rewards gradually declining with upvoting
time. The main difference is that the reputation part needs to be taken into account. Specifically, two nonlinear formulas of WD
and WS in Algorithm 1 are respectively used in this paper to represent the reputation indicator RD of the curator and the Rshares
of his/her contribution to participate in the income distribution. Where, 𝑅𝑆′ represents the total Rshares contained in a post before
the curator 𝑖 upvotes the post; 𝑅𝑆𝑖 means that the Rshares contributed by the curator 𝑖; 𝑠 is a constant, is equal to 2 × 1012 ; 𝑅𝐷𝑇
represents the total reputation indicator RD of all the curators of the post; 𝑅𝐷’ means that the total 𝑅𝐷 contained in the post
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before the curator 𝑖 upvotes the post; 𝑅𝐷𝑖 represents 𝑅𝐷 contributed by the curator 𝑖; Thus, the upvoting reward 𝑃_𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 of
each curator in the post can be calculated.
SIMULATION RESULT
This section will first describe how to determine the proper value of PR, i.e., the proportion of rewards assigned to the newly
introduced reputation indicator based on simulation analysis. Generally, the value of PR is determined by making a tradeoff
between the equity of reward distribution and the importance attached to users' historical and current contributions. Furthermore,
we will report the assessment results on the effectiveness of the proposed solution by comparing the equity distribution and the
cost to achieve reward monopoly before and after the amendment.
We use the distributional equality metric Gini Index (Wang et al., 2020) to measure the equality of the upvoting rewards
distribution in the community. Gini Index is defined as:
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =

𝑛
∑𝑛
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 |𝑃(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖 ) −𝑃(𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑗 ) |

(10)

2𝑛2 𝑥̅

where 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑖 is the upvoting reward of user 𝑖 (𝑖 ∈ [1,2, … , n]). 𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟_𝑗 is the upvoting reward of user 𝑗 (𝑗 ∈ [1,2, … , n]).
𝑥̅ is the average absolute difference of the upvoting reward of all users. A lower Gini Index indicates greater equality, with 0
representing perfect equality.
To quantify the real influence of users' historical and current contributions on reward distribution, we use 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) (0 ≤
𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) ≤ 1) to denote the correlation coefficient (Fieller, Hartley & Pearson, 1957) between users’ 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠, i.e., their
current contributions to determining the total rewards of a post, and their own upvoting rewards 𝑃𝑆𝑃 :
𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) =

𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑆,𝑃𝑆𝑃 )

(11)

√𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑆)×𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑆𝑃 )

where 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) is the correlation coefficient between the users’ Rshares and their own upvoting rewards 𝑃𝑆𝑃 . 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 )
represents the covariance between the users’ 𝑅𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 and their own upvoting rewards. 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑆) and 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) represent the
variance of the users’ Rshares and their own upvoting rewards, respectively.
Similarly, we use 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) (0 ≤ 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) ≤ 1) to denote the correlation coefficient between users’ historical contribution
and their upvoting rewards.
Dataset
We collected the ten posts in the popular list on November 22, 2020, in Steemit randomly, as shown in Table 1 below. These
posts received a total of 494 upvotes.

Table 1: Data statistics
Statistic

Average

Standard Deviation Minimum

Maximum

Number of upvotes of the post 49.4

16.0

20.0

71.0

Post rewards/Steem Power

87.2

48.8

25.0

195.5

Author rewards/Steem Power

45.2

25.1

12.5

97.9

Curator rewards/Steem Power 0.8

5.0

0.0

74.6

Reputation score
Number of effective Steem
Power of curator

56.9

16.3

-0.9

80.7

113941.7

784306.9

0.0

10094907.0

Equity of Reward Distribution
Based on the above dataset, we can obtain the correlation coefficient between users’ historical contribution and their upvoting
rewards 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) = 0.07 , the correlation coefficient between the users’ Rshares and their own upvoting rewards
𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) = 0.98 and 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.95 before the upcoming reward amendment. The high Gini Index indicates that the
current inequity level of upvoting reward distribution is extremely high in the community. Moreover, the unbalanced values
between 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) and 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) confirm that the upvoting reward distribution is mostly determined by the users’ current
Rshares, which can be easily obtained through purchasing or renting, but has little to do with their past contributions.
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In order to achieve the target that the upvoting rewards distribution of the posts can truly reflect users' contributions, we
incorporate a refined reputation indicator 𝑅𝐷 into the upvoting incentive distribution scheme. Figure 1 depicts the results of
comparing the correlation coefficients between the reputation and rewards when using the proposed indicator 𝑅𝐷 and the original
indicator 𝑅𝑈 respectively, under different proportions of reputation reward PR. The results show that the proposed 𝑅𝐷 is able to
enlarge the correlation coefficient between reputation and rewards, which is consistent with our expectation and validates the
design of the 𝑅𝐷 indicator.

Figure 1: Comparison of reputation-reward correlation coefficients using 𝑅𝐷 and 𝑅𝑈

Figure 2: Lorenz curves and Gini index with different PR values
Figure 2 shows the Lorenz curves and their corresponding Gini Index when different proportions of reputation rewards PR are
set. It can be seen from the results that when more proportions of rewards PR are allocated to the reputation aspect, the inequity
level of reward distribution decreases dramatically. Such results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed amendment by
considering the reputation aspect.
However, it should be noted that achieving absolute equity is not the ideal situation. As mentioned earlier, besides considering
users’ historical contributions to the community, we should also differentiate each user’s efforts in determining the total rewards
of a post so that they could be effectively motivated to upvote high-quality content. Although a more comprehensive mechanism
of how to make a trade-off between a user’s historical and current contributions can be further discussed, to simplify the analysis,
here we assume that a user’s historical and current contributions are equally important. Following this assumption, we aim to
find an equilibrium point of the correlation coefficient between users’ historical contribution and their upvoting rewards
𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) and the correlation coefficient between the users’ Rshares and their own upvoting rewards 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) by varying
the proportion of reputation reward 𝑃𝑅, and the results are depicted in Figure 3. It is intuitive that 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) increases while
𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) decreases along with the increase of 𝑃𝑅 in a non-linear manner. When the proportion of reputation reward 𝑃𝑅 =
0.89, the equilibrium point can be found and 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) = 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) = 0.58, and 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0.44. In the following
analyses, we keep the same setting that 𝑃𝑅=0.89.
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Figure 3: The equilibrium between 𝑅(𝑅𝐷, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 ) and 𝑅(𝑅𝑆, 𝑃𝑆𝑃 )
Figure 4 compares the users’ upvoting reward distributions of the 494 users in our dataset before and after the amendment. It
can be seen from the figure that the upvoting reward distribution of the community becomes more equal after introducing the
proposed reputation indicator, although we still give weights to the users’ current contributions indicated by their Rshares.

（a）Before amendment
（b） After amendment
Figure 4: Distribution of rewards for upvoting
Cost of Monopoly
The above analysis has demonstrated the effectiveness of our proposed amendment in addressing the inequality problem of
upvoting reward distribution. To further assess the capability of the proposed solution in resisting upvoting reward monopoly,
in this section, we evaluate and compare the costs that a user has to pay in order to achieve monopoly before and after the
amendment.
Following Avin et al. (2019), we regard obtaining 50% of a post's total upvoting rewards as a monopoly of upvoting rewards,
and we then analyze the efforts a user should make to achieve such status by assuming 20 active users are voting together on a
post. Here we define active users as those who post, comment, or upvote at least once a month. Statistical analysis of historical
data shows that the average reputation indicator 𝑅𝐷 of active users is around 350, and their average amount of Steem Power
them is around 1000. We set the 𝑅𝐷 and Steem Power of the 20 simulated users to the two average values.

Figure 5: The impact of increasing the percentage of Steem Power on the upvoting reward distribution
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We simulate two simple strategies a user may adopt to achieve monopoly. One is the reputation of the user remains the same,
and he/she gains control over reward distributions purely by accumulating Steem Power. As is shown in Figure 5, with the
original incentive mechanism, this user can get 50% of the upvoting rewards of the post if the proportion of his/her Steem Power
reaches 47% of the total Steem Power of all users who upvote the post. After the amendment, even this user controls 47% of the
total Steem Power, and he can get only 10% of the total rewards. Overall, it can be seen that after the amendment, with the
accumulation of Steem Power, the control power over reward distribution does not increase significantly. In other words, our
proposed amendment has effectively increased the cost and set the barriers for achieving a monopoly.
On the contrary, the other strategy is that a user may achieve monopoly by purely accumulating reputation rather than Steem
Power. The reputation of a user is a reflection of the Rshares he/she has obtained by posting and receiving upvotes from other
users. In order to increase the reputation value, the user should make other users with sufficient Rshares upvote his/her own
posts in a short time through bribery. The cost a user should pay to lift his/her reputation can be measured by the total Steem
Power of those users under his/her control. Figure 6 depicts the relationship between the percentage of controlled Steem Power
of the community by a user and the percentage of rewards he/she can obtain through lifting his/her reputation value. It can be
seen from the results that the cost of lifting a user’s reputation value is extremely large. Even in an extreme case that a user could
make every other user upvote his post in order to lift his reputation, he/she could only obtain less than 30% of the upvoting
rewards. Considering the huge costs, it is obviously uneconomical to pursue a monopoly through accumulating reputation. In
this aspect, the effectiveness of the proposed reputation-based incentive mechanism can be further verified.

Figure 6: The impact of improving reputation indicator RD on the upvoting reward distribution
CONCLUSION
The incentive mechanism based on tokens plays an important role in the blockchain knowledge communities. However, if the
incentive mechanism design is not reasonable, a large proportion of rewards may be monopolized by a small number of users,
and the platform will tend to be centralized. Moreover, most ordinary users keep contributing knowledge, but they fail to get the
corresponding payoff so that their sense of unfairness increases and their enthusiasm to contribute knowledge declines. This is a
general phenomenon in blockchain-driven platforms, which has been mentioned by several scholars (Beck, Müller-Bloch &
King, 2018; Li & Palanisamy, 2019; Wang et al., 2020). Steemit is one such typical case. This study has found that the existing
incentive mechanism in Steemit can reflect the users’ contributions to the growth of a post’s total rewards, but such contributions
can be largely related to the tokens purchased or rented from the external market and fail to reveal the users’ real knowledge
contributions to the community.
In order to address this problem, we take into account the users’ historical performance in knowledge creation and dissemination
without ignoring their contributions to the growth of the posts’ rewards. By taking a tradeoff, we find the optimal proportion of
rewards allocated to the reputation aspect that reflects a user’s historical contributions. The simulation results show that our
proposed solution can reduce the Gini Index of upvoting rewards distribution by 53% and increase the correlation coefficient
between user's historical performance and reward by eight times. In addition, we also analyze the costs that a user needs to pay
if he/she wants to monopolize the distribution of upvoting rewards. The simulation results indicate that after implementing the
proposed amendment to the incentive mechanism, it becomes infeasible to achieve upvoting reward monopoly by accumulating
either Rshares or reputation values.
However, due to the incompleteness of data and simplified research methodology, there are still several limitations of this work
that are worth mentioning. First, this study only constructs a static upvoting reward simulation model. Future work may attempt
to build more complex dynamic network models, which will be helpful to depict the behavior of users more accurately. Second,
the dataset used in this simulation model contains only 500 users. Subsequent studies can try a larger user sample to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed solution. Third, we amend the incentive mechanism of the community by introducing the reputation
system, with the assumption that the reputation system is not abused in the long run. However, this assumption may be violated
with some speculative strategies, which may need further investigations.
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